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Abstract 
 
Whether the information environment affects the cost of capital is a fundamental question in 
accounting and finance research. Relying on theories about competition between informed 
investors as well as the pricing of information asymmetry, we hypothesize a cross-sectional 
variation in the pricing of information asymmetry that is conditional on competition. We develop 
and validate empirical proxies for competition using the number and concentration of 
institutional investor ownership. Using these proxies, we find a lower pricing of information 
asymmetry when there is more competition. Overall, our results suggest that competition 
between informed investors has an important effect on how the information environment affects 
the cost of capital. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
 Whether information asymmetry between investors affects the cost of capital is an 
important issue in the theoretical (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Easley and O’Hara 2004; 
Hughes et al. 2007; Christensen et al. 2010; Bloomfield and Fischer 2011) and empirical 
literature (e.g., Brennan and Subrahmanyam 1996; Easley et al. 2002; Duarte and Young 2009; 
Mohanram and Rajgopal 2009). In this study, we examine the role of competition, defined as the 
rivalry among informed investors to acquire and trade profitably on private information, in the 
pricing of information asymmetry. We define private information as exclusive information 
received directly from the firm and/or from proprietary insights. Our key hypothesis and finding 
is that the pricing of information asymmetry decreases when there is more competition. This 
finding is important because it suggests that, in the presence of information asymmetry, more 
competition can lower the cost of capital. Furthermore, as we describe below, this finding has 
implications for a large body of literature that investigates the pricing of information quality 
(e.g., Botosan 1997; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Francis et al. 2004, 2005; Core et al. 2008; Ng 
2011). 
The intuition for our hypothesis on the role of competition in the pricing of information 
asymmetry is as follows. Theories show that, for a given level of information asymmetry, the 
degree of exploitation of private information by informed traders is lower when there is more 
competition (e.g., Holden and Subrahmanyam 1992, 1994; Foster and Viswanathan 1993, 1994, 
1996).1 This occurs because competition leads private information to be incorporated into prices 
more quickly (i.e., prices become more informative about fundamental value). This effect has 
two potential implications for the pricing of information asymmetry. First, in a Kyle (1985) type 
                                                 
1 We use the terms “investors” and “traders” interchangeably. While this approach is consistent with the literature, 
we discuss some distinctions in Section 3. 
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model, competition reduces the need for market makers to price protect because it lowers the 
extent to which information asymmetry is exploited. Second, in an Easley and O’Hara (2004) 
type model, competition reduces the risk of information asymmetry to uninformed investors 
because the collective trades by informed investors lead to greater information being reflected in 
the equilibrium price.   
To the best of our knowledge, while there are theories on competition over information in 
equity markets, no prior study has attempted to measure such competition. Hence, before we test 
our hypothesis, we first develop and validate our proxies of competition. To develop the proxies, 
we rely on two key assumptions: (1) institutional investors are also relatively more informed 
investors (Arbel and Strebel 1983; Sias and Starks 1997; Bartov et al. 2000; Jiambalvo et al. 
2002), and (2) the competition between informed investors captures the competition between 
informed traders (Lehavy and Sloan 2008). We then construct two measures of competition 
using data on institutional investors’ ownership: (1) the number of total institutional investors, 
and (2) the Herfindahl index, which measures the distribution of information among these 
investors (Herfindahl 1950). Recognizing that transient institutional investors are the ones most 
likely to trade actively on information (Bushee 1998; Ke and Petroni 2004; Ke and 
Ramalingegowda 2005), we also construct analogous proxies using data on transient institutional 
investor ownership. 
Our empirical proxies are motivated from theories on competition over information in the 
equity markets and from economic theory. The number of informed investors follows directly 
from theories that characterize the degree of competition using the number of informed traders 
(e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer 1988; Holden and Subrahmanyam 1992; Foster and Viswanathan 
1993; Easley and O’Hara 2004). The use of the Herfindahl index, on the other hand, is an 
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adaptation of a widely used measure of competition in product markets to competition in capital 
markets. We use this index to capture the distribution of private information among informed 
investors, with the notion that a more equal distribution results in greater competition (Foster and 
Viswanathan 1994). As the distribution of private information is not directly observable or 
measurable, we construct a proxy that uses the distribution of shares among informed investors. 
The underlying assumption is that informed investors with higher holdings in a given firm are 
more likely to have more private information because of greater access to the firm or greater 
incentives to generate private information; hence, the concentration of shares among informed 
investors captures, with noise, the concentration of private information. 
We begin our analyses by validating our competition proxies. A key prediction from 
theoretical models is that competition reduces market inefficiency and the rents earned by 
informed investors. That is, future abnormal returns from trading on market inefficiencies should 
be lower when there is more competition. We provide evidence that more (less) competition is 
associated with a smaller (larger) drift in prices after earnings announcements. 
We then examine the role of competition in the pricing of information asymmetry. We 
proxy for information asymmetry using the information asymmetry component of the bid-ask 
spreads developed by Glosten and Harris (1988). Our sample consists of 83,988 (NYSE, AMEX 
and NASDAQ) firm-years from 1983 to 2008, which, when matched to monthly returns, yield a 
sample of 968,250 firm-months from January 1984 to December 2009. Using cross-sectional 
asset pricing regressions, we find significant evidence that the pricing of information asymmetry 
is lower when there is more competition. For instance, the difference in the pricing of the 
information asymmetry component of spread between the least competitive and the most 
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competitive quintile ranges from 0.47 percent to 0.86 percent per month, depending on the 
competition measure used.  
We conduct a series of additional analyses to gauge the robustness of our findings. First, 
we repeat the analyses with the information asymmetry component of PIN; this component, 
obtained from Duarte and Young (2009), is available only for NYSE and AMEX firms for the 
sample period from 1983 to 2004. While we continue to find that the pricing of information 
asymmetry is lower when there is more competition, the economic and statistical significance is 
slightly weaker. We show that one reason for these weaker results is that NASDAQ firms are 
excluded from the analysis. Specifically, we find that the effect of competition on the pricing of 
information asymmetry of spread is mainly driven by NASDAQ (as opposed to NYSE and 
AMEX) firms. We also split our sample into two periods—pre- and post-Reg FD—because Reg 
FD could have had a significant influence on the nature, collection, and dissemination of private 
information (Mohanram and Sunder 2006). We find that the effect of competition on the pricing 
of information asymmetry is statistically significant in the pre-Reg FD period but not in the post-
Reg FD period. However, the economic magnitude of the effect appears to be larger in the post-
Reg FD period. One possible explanation for the lack of statistical significance in the post-Reg 
FD period is the lack of power due to the shorter time series. 
Finally, we examine whether investor competition influences the pricing of information 
asymmetry using accounting-based measures of information quality to proxy for information 
asymmetry. An extensive literature argues that information quality is priced because poor 
information quality is associated with higher information asymmetry, and information 
asymmetry is priced (e.g., Botosan 1997; Francis et al. 2004, 2005). To measure information 
quality, we use accruals quality and earnings smoothness because these measures have been 
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recently used to examine the pricing of information quality (Francis et al. 2004, 2005; Core et al. 
2008; McInnis 2010; Mashruwala and Mashruwala, 2011). Consistent with our primary results, 
we find some evidence that the pricing of information quality decreases with competition.  
 This study contributes to the literature in at least two ways. First, it draws upon the 
theoretical literature to make predictions about the effect of the competition over information on 
the pricing of information asymmetry. We show that the pricing of information asymmetry 
decreases with such competition, and that the effect is economically important. While the idea of 
competition over information has been discussed in the theoretical literature, to the best of our 
knowledge, no prior empirical study has investigated the outcomes of such competition. In doing 
so, one contribution of our study is that we develop empirical proxies for competition over 
information—the number of informed investors and the Herfindahl index of the concentration of 
institutional holdings. We show that these proxies behave according to the theoretical prediction 
that competition reduces market inefficiency and economic rents.  
Second, we extend previous literature that has empirically investigated the pricing of 
information asymmetry and information quality (e.g., Easley et al. 2002; Francis et al. 2004, 
2005; Core et al. 2008; Duarte and Young 2009; Mohanram and Rajgopal 2009; McInnis 2010). 
We show that the extent of the competition over information has an important role in 
determining whether information asymmetry/quality is priced. Stated differently, information 
asymmetry/quality is more likely to be priced in trading environments where there is less 
competition over information. Our study highlights the importance of the nature of competition 
in the trading environment in determining the pricing of information asymmetry/quality.  
Our study is related to Armstrong et al. (2011), as both studies examine the effect of 
competition on the pricing of information asymmetry. The key difference is the conceptual 
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definition of competition. Armstrong et al. (2011) define competition as the extent to which 
investors’ trades have price impact. Specifically, they argue that when there are more 
shareholders (their proxy for competition), there is lower price impact. Our study, in contrast, 
defines competition as the rivalry among informed investors to acquire and trade profitably on 
private information. Theories about such competition predict that increased competition among 
informed traders means that their private information gets impounded into prices more quickly, 
which, in turn, reduces the degree of exploitation of private information by informed traders. 
Thus, consistent with their different conceptualizations of competition, both studies use different 
proxies of competition. Armstrong et al. (2011) use the number of total shareholders, whereas we 
use the number of institutional investors and the concentration of institutional investor 
ownership. The concentration of ownership is an innovation of our study that borrows from the 
microeconomic literature on product market competition to capture competition among informed 
investors in capital markets.  
Section II develops our hypothesis. Section III describes our research design. Sections IV 
and V present our results on the pricing of information asymmetry and information quality, 
respectively. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Hypothesis Development 
In this section, we develop our hypothesis on how cross-sectional variation in 
competition affects the pricing of information asymmetry between informed and less 
informed/uninformed traders. Kyle (1985) shows how an informed trader, with a monopoly over 
private information, strategically trades to exploit his/her private information. In this model, the 
informed trader’s private information reveals that there is a difference between the current 
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market price and the underlying value of the firm. The informed trader profits by trading against 
the market makers and liquidity traders (also known as less informed traders). Notably, s/he 
trades in small quantities over time to camouflage his/her trades and maximize profits.2 As a 
result of these trades, private information is gradually incorporated into prices and the market 
price converges to the underlying value. Market makers price protect in a manner that imposes 
trading costs on all traders. In particular, the increased price impact of the trades results in traders 
buying (selling) shares at average higher (lower) prices.3 To the extent that traders require a 
return to be compensated for trading costs, the cost of capital is higher for firms with higher 
trading costs (Amihud and Mendelson 1986). In other words, in this model, information 
asymmetry is priced. 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992, 1994), Foster and 
Viswanathan (1993, 1994, 1996), and many others extend Kyle (1985) to incorporate multiple 
informed traders, as opposed to a single informed trader.  In particular, Holden and 
Subrahmanyam (1992, 247) note that “Kyle’s (1985) assumption of a single informed trader is 
strong in the sense that in actual financial markets, it is reasonable to expect that at least a few 
players will have access to private information and trade in the knowledge that they will face 
competition with other informed agents in the market.” A greater number of informed traders 
causes these traders to compete more aggressively, which, in turn, causes their private 
information to be revealed more rapidly. As Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992, 248) state, “The 
contrast in results between the case of a monopolistic informed trader and that of multiple 
                                                 
2 Prior literature has provided evidence consistent with informed traders selecting trade sizes to camouflage their 
trades (e.g., Barclay and Warner 1993; Chakravarty 2001; Alexander and Peterson 2007; Anand and Chakravarty 
2007).  
3 As shown by Glosten and Milgrom (1985), trading costs can also be imposed on traders through bid-ask spreads 
(instead of price impact). Greater information asymmetry results in larger spreads, which means that investors have 
to buy (sell) each unit of shares at a higher ask (lower bid) price. 
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informed traders is driven by aggressive competition between these traders.… the unique Nash 
equilibrium is an equilibrium in which imperfect competitors acting noncooperatively choose 
larger quantities than a monopolist (or collusive agents) would choose.” They also demonstrate 
that, in the limit (in which the number of informed traders extends to infinity), all private 
information is revealed in the first trade so that profit from informed trading converges to zero. 
One implication of these models is that an increase in the number of informed investors 
results in a more competitive environment, which causes private information to be incorporated 
into prices more quickly (i.e., prices become informative about fundamental value faster). With 
more informative prices, there is less need for market makers to price protect. In other words, for 
a given level of information asymmetry, the degree of exploitation of private information by 
informed investors is lower when there is more competition. Thus, investors (on average) 
demand a lower return for that level of information asymmetry, which makes the pricing of 
information asymmetry smaller.4 
The discussion thus far has focused on markets with imperfect liquidity; in these markets, 
information asymmetry is priced because investors demand compensation for trading costs. 
Competition can influence the pricing of information asymmetry even in markets with perfect 
liquidity because competition reduces the risk that certain investors face when others have 
private information. Easley and O’Hara (2004) propose a model in which informed investors use 
their information advantage to trade with uninformed investors, and hold portfolios more heavily 
weighted to stocks with positive private information and against stocks with negative private 
information. The information asymmetry increases the risk to the uninformed investors, who 
                                                 
4 Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) show that public disclosure, by bringing private information into the public 
domain, also affects the cost of capital by reducing information-asymmetry-related trading costs. 
 
 
9
cannot adjust their portfolios to account for private information. In equilibrium, information 
asymmetry is priced to reflect the information risk to uninformed investors.5 
In this model, competition also reduces the pricing of information asymmetry. 
Specifically, as shown in Easley and O’Hara (2004, 1572), increasing the number of informed 
traders serves this purpose. The intuition for this result is similar to the discussion in the previous 
section. Increasing competition means that informed traders’ collective trades are more 
informative and more information is reflected in the equilibrium price. In particular, Easley and 
O’Hara note that, if more traders are informed, then their information is revealed to the 
uninformed investor with greater precision. This makes the stock less risky for uninformed 
investors, reducing the pricing of information asymmetry. 
In light of the above arguments, our hypothesis is that, ceteris paribus, more competition 
reduces the pricing of information asymmetry by reducing the degree of exploitation of private 
information by informed traders. Hence, our hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is: 
Hypothesis: The pricing of information asymmetry decreases with more competition. 
 
Before we proceed, we note that competition in the equity markets is analogous to 
competition over sales in the product markets (Holden and Subrahmanyam 1992). In product 
markets, firms with monopoly power over product sales extract rents from consumers; more 
competition between firms over product sales reduces this exploitation (Samuelson and 
Nordhaus 2009). In equity markets, informed traders with monopoly power over private 
information extract rents by trading against less informed traders (e.g., liquidity traders). More 
competition between informed traders over private information reduces market inefficiency, in 
                                                 
5 There is a dispute in the theoretical literature as to whether information asymmetry results in priced information 
risk. Hughes et al. (2007) and Lambert et al. (2011) show that information risk, as modeled in Easley and O’Hara 
(2004), is diversifiable. In particular, they show that when the number of assets (and the number of investors) 
extends to infinity, information risk is no longer priced. That is, the analysis in Easley and O’Hara relies on the 
number of assets being finite.  
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that it causes prices to reflect private information more quickly and reduces rent extraction. In 
the next section, we rely on the above analogy in the construction of our measures of competition 
in equity markets.  
 
III.  Measures of Competition 
Testing our hypothesis requires a proxy for the degree of competition. While the prior 
theoretical literature has examined issues related to information-based competition in the equity 
markets, we are unaware of previous attempts in the empirical literature to measure such 
competition. Before we proceed to discussing the specific proxies, we highlight two important 
assumptions underlying them.  
First, we assume that institutional investors belong to the class of informed investors - 
i.e., investors with private information. As discussed by Admati and Pfleiderer (1988, 7), 
privately informed traders include traders who “observe something about the piece of public 
information that will be revealed one period later to all traders or who are able to process public 
information faster or more efficiently than others are.” In a similar vein, Kim and Verrecchia 
(1994, 42) note that some market participants “process earnings announcements into private 
information…traders capable of informed judgments from public sources can be thought of as 
market experts who follow a firm closely (e.g., large shareholders, financial analysts, managers 
at competing firms).” Consistent with these claims, several studies have shown that institutional 
investors, as opposed to individual retail investors, are more likely to be informed investors (e.g., 
Arbel and Strebel 1983; Sias and Starks 1997; Bartov et al. 2000; Jiambalvo et al. 2002).  
Second, theoretical models of trading (e.g., Kyle 1985) are models about traders, as 
opposed to investors. One difference between traders and investors is that traders include both 
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potential investors (i.e., investors who do not currently hold shares in a company) and existing 
investors. Ideally, we would measure competition between informed traders for a stock, but this 
information is not observable. Thus, we measure competition between informed investors, under 
the assumption that the number of existing investors captures the number of current and potential 
investors.6 This assumption is consistent with prior research. For instance, Lehavy and Sloan 
(2008, 331), when confronting a similar challenge, state the following: “We cannot directly 
observe how many investors ‘know about’ a particular security. We can, however, observe the 
number of institutional investors who own a security. It seems reasonable to argue that the 
number of investors who know about a security is increasing in the number of investors that own 
the security.” 
Our first proxy of competition is the number of informed investors, which we measure as 
the number of institutional investors holding the firm’s stock (#Inst). This measure follows 
directly from the theory models discussed in Section II (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer 1988; 
Holden and Subrahmanyam 1992; Foster and Viswanathan 1993). In particular, these models use 
the number of informed traders to represent the extent of competition between informed traders, 
such that a greater number of informed traders indicates more competition. As noted in Holden 
and Subrahmanyam (1992), an extension of Kyle’s (1985) model of a single informed investor to 
a model with two (or more) informed investors is mathematically equivalent to an extension of a 
model of monopoly pricing to one of duopoly pricing. That is, increased competition from one to 
                                                 
6 To the best of our knowledge, there is no data available on the number of potential informed investors. In 
untabulated analyses, we have computed proxies for the number of institutional investors using ownership from the 
previous five years, independent of whether the institution was still a shareholder at the end of the period. The 
intention is to capture the potential number of informed investors as opposed to the actual number. These variables 
are highly correlated with ours (correlations of 0.96 and 0.84 for total and transient institutional investors 
respectively) and inferences are the same as they are for our variables.  
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multiple competitors results in a reduction in extracted rents from less informed investors; in the 
limit of perfect competition, profit equals zero.  
Our second measure of competition explores the distribution of information among 
informed investors. An important idea in the industrial organization literature is that, not only 
does the number of firms matter, so does the distribution of their market shares (e.g., Herfindahl 
1950). In a similar vein, we argue that in addition to the number of informed investors, the 
distribution of private information among informed investors can affect trading behavior and the 
resulting profits. A more equal distribution of private information implies that information will 
be more quickly revealed in prices due to more competitive trading among informed investors 
(Foster and Viswanathan 1994). Hence, the degree of competition increases not only with the 
number of informed investors, but also with the distribution of private information among them.  
 Conceptually, the construct of interest is the distribution of private information among 
informed investors, with the notion that a more equal distribution results in greater competition. 
However, this distribution is not directly observable or measurable. Hence, we use the 
distribution of shares to proxy for the distribution of private information. That is, we assume that 
informed investors with higher holdings on a given firm are likely to have more private 
information. This could occur for two reasons.  First, the larger investor could have more access 
to the firm (e.g., by appointing directors to sit on corporate boards or by having relatively more 
exclusive access to management), and therefore would be able to obtain more privileged 
information. Second, the larger investor, by having a higher investment in the firm, has greater 
incentives to generate private information about the firm. 
We note that, as shown in theories on competition over private information, an increase 
in the monopoly power over private information enables informed investors to earn economic 
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rents from trading on private information against uninformed investors. Thus, the use of the 
distribution of institutional holdings (as a proxy for the distribution of private information) in the 
securities market is analogous to the use of the distribution of size or sales to estimate the 
distribution of market power in product markets. 
Hence, we propose a measure of the amount of competition in stock i, HerfInst, based on 
the Herfindahl index. This measure takes into account the number and relative holdings of shares 
of each institutional investor for a given firm. The computation is as follows:       
2
,
1
1 ,
N
i j
i
j i
Investor
HerfInst
Investor
                     (1) 
where Investori,j is the number of shares held by institutional investor j in stock i, Investorsi is the 
total shares held by all institutional investors of stock i, and N is the total number of institutional 
investors in stock i. Given that the typical Herfindahl index measures concentration, we multiply 
the Herfindahl index by minus one so that a higher value of HerfInst measures more competition 
in the trades of stock i.  
 As discussed above, we use institutional investors as a proxy for informed competition. 
Prior research, however, has shown that certain types of institutional investors are more likely to 
trade on information (e.g., Grinblatt and Keloharju 2000; Ke and Petroni 2004; Ke and 
Ramalingegowda 2005). For example, a commonly used institutional investor classification by 
Bushee (1998) divides institutional investors into transient investors, dedicated investors, and 
quasi-indexers. Ke and Petroni (2004) and Ke and Ramalingegowda (2005) find that transient 
institutional investors (i.e., institutional investors who hold small stakes in numerous firms and 
trade frequently in and out of stocks) trade on information to make profitable trades. Hence, in 
the same vein as our earlier measures based on total institutional investor ownership, we measure 
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the number of transient institutional investors, #Trans, and the Herfindahl index for competition, 
HerfTrans. If a firm does not have any transient institutional investors but has other types of 
institutional investors, we set #Trans is zero and HerfTrans to minus one to reflect no 
competition among transient institutional investors. 
 We construct the above measures of competition by employing data from the institutional 
investor database used by Bushee (1998). Briefly, Bushee constructs several variables related to 
institutional investors using data from the CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) Holdings (s34) 
database available from Thomson Reuters. In particular, his database provides quarterly data on 
the institutional investors of each firm, as well as the classification of each institutional investor 
as transient, dedicated, or quasi-indexing. For each year, we compute our proxies of competition 
using the data for the December quarter. 
Validating our Measures of Competition  
While we motivate the above proxies based on prior theories that have studied the 
concept of competition between informed investors, we acknowledge that each proxy is an 
imperfect measure of competition. We provide some construct validity tests by examining 
whether these proxies behave according to a key prediction of theories on competition: in the 
presence of information asymmetry, competition reduces market inefficiency and the economic 
rents (in terms of abnormal stock returns) of informed investors.  
We test this prediction using the post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD) setting. 
PEAD is a suitable setting to validate our proxies for two reasons. First, we need to identify an 
event for which informed investors are more likely to have an information advantage. Earnings 
announcements are one such event. Lee et al. (1993) document a significant increase in 
information asymmetry and trades during earnings announcements, consistent with Kim and 
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Verrecchia’s (1994) argument that earnings announcements represent an event in which 
sophisticated investors convert the information on earnings into private information. Second, the 
PEAD literature has documented significant evidence of market inefficiency with respect to 
earnings announcements (e.g., Ball and Brown 1968; Bernard and Thomas 1989, 1990). To the 
extent that competition reduces market inefficiencies, we would predict that PEAD would be 
smaller for firms with higher competition. 
We first obtain a sample of quarterly earnings announcements from NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ firms from 1983 to 2008 (and returns from 1984 to 2009). We define an earnings 
surprise for firm i in fiscal quarter q, UEi,q, as: 
, , 4
,
, 4
,i q i qi q
i q
E E
UE
MV


                 (2) 
where Ei,q is the most recent quarterly earnings, Ei,q-4 is the quarterly earnings four fiscal quarters 
ago, and MVi,q-4 is the market value at the end of the fiscal quarter four fiscal quarters ago. 
To examine how PEAD returns vary cross-sectionally with competition, we form five-by-
five portfolios by sorting earnings surprises and competition into quintiles within each quarter. 
Hence, each firm-quarter is assigned to a UE quintile (UE quintile) and a competition quintile 
(Competition Quintile). To calculate 12-month abnormal returns (AbRet12), we collect monthly 
returns from CRSP for the 12-month period beginning from the month following the 
announcement month. For each firm-quarter, we compute the size-adjusted return by subtracting 
the buy-and-hold return in the same CRSP size-matched decile from the buy-and-hold return of 
the firm, with size measured as the market capitalization at the beginning of the calendar year. If 
a firm delists during the buy-and-hold period, we include its delisting returns; if the delisting 
returns are missing, we assume a delisting return of 100 percent if the delisting arises due to 
performance-related reasons (Sloan 1996; Ng et al. 2008). We then determine the average buy-
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and-hold return for each portfolio by averaging the buy-and-hold returns of all firm-quarters 
within the portfolio. 
Table 1, Panel A presents the portfolio results. Consistent with the PEAD literature, we 
find that portfolio abnormal returns are positive (negative) for the top (bottom) quintile of 
earnings surprise. When we examine the pattern of portfolio returns across the top (bottom) 
quintile, we find that the magnitude of the positive (negative) returns in the top (bottom) quintile 
becomes less positive (negative) when competition increases. Thus, the hedge portfolio returns 
(i.e., returns from buying (shorting) firms in the top (bottom) quintile of earnings surprises) 
become smaller as competition increases. These results are consistent across all our four proxies 
of competition. For example, with HerfInst (HerfTrans) as the proxy for competition, we find 
that the hedge portfolio returns decrease from 13.55 percent (11.90 percent) in the least 
competitive quintile to 2.95 percent (2.90 percent) in the most competitive quintile. Overall, the 
degree of market inefficiency associated with PEAD is smaller when there is higher competition. 
Next, in Table 1, Panel B we estimate cross-sectional regressions to control for 
previously documented determinants of PEAD. In particular, we control for volume and 
volatility because these variables are likely correlated with our measure of competition and 
because they have been documented by the prior literature to be determinants of PEAD (e.g., 
Bhushan 1994; Mendenhall 2004). Volume is the average daily dollar trading volume of the firm 
during the earnings announcement month. Volatility is the standard deviation of the residuals of a 
regression of daily returns on the S&P 500 during the twelve months ending in the 
announcement month, with the requirement that at least 24 daily returns are available for the 
regression. 
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 The dependent variable is AbRet12. We sort firms into quintiles on the basis of earnings 
surprises. UE quintile is the quintile portfolio to which a firm-quarter has been assigned based on 
its unexpected earnings within each quarter. Similarly, we sort firms into quintiles based on 
competition, trading volume, and return volatility (Competition, Volume, and Volatility). To 
facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients on the interaction terms, we rescale the quintile 
ranks to range from zero to one. Finally, we include beta, size, and book-to-market to control for 
risk. 
Table 1, Panel B presents the results of the regressions. The coefficient of interest is the 
interaction term between UE and Competition. Each of the four columns in Panel B has a 
different competition proxy. In all four columns, we find that the hedge portfolio returns 
decrease with competition. For example, in Column 2 (Column 4), the competition proxy is 
HerfInst (HerfTrans). The coefficient on UE × Competition of -8.11 (-6.35) indicates that the 
hedge portfolio returns in the most competitive quintile of HerfInst (HerfTrans) are smaller than 
those in the least competitive quintile by 8.11 percent (6.35 percent).   
<INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
Overall, we find strong evidence from both portfolio tests and cross-sectional regressions 
that there is a smaller PEAD (i.e., less market inefficiency) when there is more competition, as 
measured using our proxies. To the extent that competition reduces market inefficiency as the 
theory predicts, this evidence suggests that these proxies capture competition. 
 
IV.  The Role of Competition in the Pricing of Information Asymmetry 
To test our hypothesis, we rely on the following cross-sectional asset pricing regression 
specification:  
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Ri,t+1 =  α + Σβj Riskj,i,t + λ1 NIASpreadi + λ2 IASpreadi,t + λ3 Turnoveri,t + λ4 Competitioni,t  
+ λ5 Turnoveri,t x NIASpreadi,t + λ6 Turnoveri,t x IASpreadi,t  
+ λ7 Competitioni,t x NIASpreadi,t + λ8 Competitioni,t x IASpreadi,t + εi,t+1,         (3) 
Rt+1 is the monthly excess return during the 12-month period, i.e., January to December, in year 
t+1 (in the event of a delisting, a firm’s delisting return, when available from CRSP, is used as 
the monthly return). Risk is a vector consisting of Beta, Size, and BTM. Beta is the market beta 
from the regression of daily excess stock returns on the daily excess market returns in the 
calendar year, with a minimum requirement of 24 daily returns. Size is the natural logarithm of 
the market value of equity in millions at the end of year t. BTM is the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity at the fiscal year end at least three 
months before the end of year t. IASpread (NIASpread) is the information asymmetry component 
(non-information asymmetry component) of the bid-ask spread for year t; these components are 
obtained using the spread decomposition model in Glosten and Harris (1988), details of which 
are presented in Appendix A.7 Turnover is the monthly share turnover in December of year t. 
Competition is either #Inst, HerfInst, #Trans, or HerfTrans, as defined earlier.  
We include the NIASpread, as well as its interactions with Competition, to better isolate 
the effects of competition on pricing of information asymmetry. The inclusion of Turnover, as 
well as its interactions with IASpread and NIASpread, is to address the concern that Competition 
could be simply capturing stock liquidity.8 To mitigate the effect of cross-sectional dependence 
in the regression residuals, we follow the prior literature and estimate Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
                                                 
7 In an additional analysis later in the study, we use the information asymmetry component of PIN developed by 
Duarte and Young (2009) as an alternative proxy for information asymmetry. We also use accruals quality and 
smoothness which capture, among other things, information asymmetry. 
8 In untabulated analysis, we also have used total trading volume as an alternative proxy for liquidity. We use 
turnover in the main tests because this variable, which is scaled by total outstanding shares, is likely to better capture 
differences in stock liquidity across firms in the cross-section. The results with volume yield similar inferences. 
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regressions. Specifically, we first run cross-sectional regressions for each month in the sample. 
Each reported coefficient is the average of the monthly coefficients. The t-statistic for each 
reported coefficient is obtained by dividing the coefficient by the standard error of the monthly 
coefficients. 
 In the above regression, the coefficient of interest is the coefficient on the interaction 
term between Competition and IASpread, λ8. To ease exposition, we rank Competition and 
Turnover into quintiles every year and then scale the quintile rank so that it ranges from zero to 
one. As such, λ8 indicates the incremental pricing of information asymmetry as one moves from 
the bottom to the top quintile of competition. Based on our hypothesis that the pricing of 
information asymmetry is decreasing in competition, we expect λ8 to be negative.  
 Table 2 presents summary statistics and the correlations for the variables used in our tests 
of Eq. (3). There are 83,988 firm-years from 1983 to 2008 with data to measure information 
asymmetry, competition, and control variables. We match each firm-year to monthly returns in 
the following year, yielding a sample of 968,250 firm-months with monthly returns from January 
1984 to December 2009. 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for our sample. First, we present statistics for 
our measures of the information-asymmetry and non-information-asymmetry components of the 
bid-ask spread, IASpread and NIASpread. IASpread and NIASpread have a mean of 0.23 percent 
and 1.13 percent, respectively. Moving on to our competition measures, the mean number of 
institutional investors (transient institutional investors) is 89.33 (27.10). The mean Herfindahl 
competition index based on institutional investors (transient institutional investors) is -0.17 (-
0.37). The mean market beta is 0.88. The median market capitalization and book-to-market of 
 
 
20
equity are $257 million (=exp(5.55)) and 0.49 (=exp(-0.71)), respectively. Finally, the mean 
monthly share turnover is 0.09. 
Panel B presents Pearson correlations among the variables. All the correlations are 
significant at p<0.01. The positive correlation between IASpread and NIASpread indicates that 
stocks with a higher information asymmetry component of spread have a higher non-information 
asymmetry component of spread. In addition, consistent with the theories on competition, 
IASpread is negatively correlated with competition. All competition measures are positively and 
significantly correlated with each other. For example, #Inst has pairwise correlations of 0.39, 
0.90, and 0.50 with HerfInst, #Trans, and HerfTrans, respectively. There are also positive 
pairwise correlations between our competition measures and Turnover. One explanation for these 
correlations is that greater competition increases the extent to which shares turn over among 
investors.  
<INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
 Table 3 presents the regression results of the cross-sectional asset pricing tests based on 
Eq. (3). For comparability across different measures, we assume a one standard deviation 
difference in IASpread when we make inferences about the economic significance of the 
coefficient on the interaction term between Competition and IASpread; this standard deviation is 
0.33 (see Table 2). We then examine how this difference translates into a difference in the 
pricing of information asymmetry between the most and least competitive quintiles by 
multiplying the standard deviation and the coefficient on the interaction term between IASpread 
and each proxy for competition. 
The results in Column 1 indicate that neither the information asymmetry nor the non-
information asymmetry components of spread are priced, on average. In the remaining columns, 
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we test our hypothesis on the role of competition in the pricing of information asymmetry by 
examining whether there is a cross-sectional difference in the pricing of the information 
asymmetry component of spread conditional on competition.  
Consistent with our hypothesis, the coefficient on the interaction term between IASpread 
and various proxies of competition is negative and statistically significant in all four columns. 
For instance, with #Inst (HerfInst) as the measure of competition, the coefficient is -2.48 (-1.66), 
which is statistically significant at p<0.05. This indicates that the pricing of (a one standard 
deviation difference in) information asymmetry in the most competitive quintile is 0.79 percent 
(0.53 percent) per month less than it is in the least competitive quintile. Similarly, with #Trans 
(HerfTrans) as the measure of information asymmetry, the pricing of information asymmetry in 
the most competitive quintile is 0.86 percent (0.47 percent) lower than it is in the least 
competitive quintile. Finally, we note that there is generally no statistically significant evidence 
of a difference in the pricing of the non-information asymmetry component of spread that is 
conditional on competition. This is important because, while one might expect competition to 
affect the overall pricing of spread, our results indicate that competition among informed 
investors only affects the pricing of the information asymmetry component of spread. Hence, 
competition over information appears to be driving our results. Overall, these results are 
consistent with our prediction that the pricing of information asymmetry decreases with more 
competition.9 
<INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
Alternative Measure of Information Asymmetry - AdjPIN 
                                                 
9 In untabulated tests, we find that our results are robust to controlling for the number of shareholders (the proxy for 
competition used in Armstrong et al. (2011)). Further, in our sample we find no evidence that the number of 
shareholders affects the pricing of information asymmetry. We note, however, that the differences in samples and 
research designs between Armstrong et al. and our study could explain the difference in the results.    
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In this section, we repeat our earlier analyses using the adjusted probability of informed 
trading, AdjPIN, as an alternative measure of information asymmetry. The probability of 
informed trading, which is commonly known as PIN, is based on the sequential trade model by 
Easley et al. (1996). Duarte and Young (2009) decompose PIN into an information asymmetry 
component, adjusted PIN (AdjPIN), and a non-information asymmetry component, the 
probability of a symmetric order flow shock (PSOS). They motivate this decomposition by 
noting that while the sequential trade model underlying PIN attributes abnormal trading to 
private information, this trading could also result from liquidity shocks.  
We obtain the AdjPIN and PSOS used in Duarte and Young (2009). Since AdjPIN and 
PSOS are available only for NYSE and AMEX firms from 1983 to 2004, we present the analysis 
with AdjPIN as an additional analysis—the analysis uses a smaller cross-section (because of the 
exclusion of NASDAQ firms) and a shorter time-series (because the sample ends in 2004). The 
sample consists of 470,875 firm-months with monthly returns from January 1984 to December 
2005. 
In the first column of Table 4, the results indicate that AdjPIN is not priced, while PSOS 
is. These results are consistent with Duarte and Young (2009). The remaining columns present 
the regression results conditional on competition. All coefficients on the interaction term 
between AdjPIN and Competition are negative and statistically significant at p<0.10. In terms of 
economic significance, the coefficient on the interaction term between AdjPIN and HerfInst 
indicates a monthly differential in the required rate of return of 0.30 percent (=3.30 × 0.09), the 
latter being the standard deviation for AdjPIN in our sample) per month between stocks in the 
least and most competitive quintiles for a one standard deviation difference in information 
asymmetry. Finally, we note that there is no evidence of a cross-sectional difference in the 
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pricing of PSOS conditional on competition. Thus, competition affects only the pricing of the 
information asymmetry component of PIN. 
<INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
Additional Analyses 
Overall, the results in our earlier analyses are consistent with our hypothesis that the 
pricing of information asymmetry decreases with competition. In this section, we conduct a 
number of additional analyses. For parsimony, we present results with HerfInst and HerfTrans as 
our proxies for competition. To the extent that it is important to take into account the distribution 
of private information among informed investors when measuring competition, these measures 
are likely to be better proxies for competition. 
NYSE and AMEX versus NASDAQ Firms 
The results in Table 4, when compared to Table 3, suggest that the effect of competition 
on the pricing of AdjPIN is not as strong as the effect of competition on the pricing of IASpread. 
One possible explanation is that AdjPIN is available only for NYSE and AMEX firms, while 
IASpread is also available for NASDAQ firms. To investigate this explanation, we repeat the 
analyses in Table 3 after dividing the full sample into a subsample of NYSE and AMEX firms 
and a subsample of NASDAQ firms. For comparability with the AdjPIN results, we restrict the 
sample period to 1983 to 2004. 
              Table 5 presents these results. All variables presented in Table 3 are included in the 
model but, for brevity, we only present the coefficients for our main variables. The first two 
columns document the results for NYSE and AMEX firms; the next two document the results for 
NASDAQ firms. The coefficient of interest is the coefficient on the interaction term between 
Competition and IASpread.  
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The effect of competition on the pricing of information asymmetry is stronger (in 
magnitude and statistical significance) for NASDAQ firms than it is for NYSE and AMEX 
firms. Specifically, for NYSE and AMEX firms, the coefficients on the interaction term between 
Competition and IASpread are -0.90 (0.01) with HerfInst (HerfTrans) as the measure of 
competition; these coefficients are not statistically significant. In contrast, for NASDAQ firms, 
the coefficients are -2.44 and -1.63, which are statistically significant. On one hand, this result 
provides a possible explanation for the weaker results when AdjPIN is used to examine how the 
pricing of information asymmetry varies with competition. That is, competition has an 
insignificant effect on the pricing of information asymmetry among NYSE and AMEX firms, 
possibly because there is less information asymmetry and/or less variation in information 
asymmetry. On the other hand, this result also highlights the importance of identifying settings in 
which competition is likely to have a greater role in the pricing of information asymmetry.10  
<INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE> 
Pre- and Post-Regulation Fair Disclosure  
In this section, we provide some exploratory analyses of whether there is a difference in 
the role of competition in the pricing of information asymmetry before and after 2000, the year 
in which Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) was implemented. The motivation for this 
analysis is that Reg FD could have had a significant influence on the nature of private 
information and how it is collected and disseminated. For example, Mohanram and Sunder 
(2006) examine the change in the nature of information available to analysts around Reg FD and 
find an increase in the precision of idiosyncratic information available to analysts, leading to 
                                                 
10 In untabulated analyses, we find that the mean and standard deviation of IASpread for NASDAQ (NYSE/AMEX) 
firms are 0.30% and 0.37% (0.20% and 0.30%), respectively. Thus, NASDAQ firms have a higher and wider cross-
sectional variation in information asymmetry. This lends support to the evidence that NASDAQ firms might be a 
more powerful sample for examining how the pricing of information asymmetry varies with competition. 
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better analyst performance. Thus, we split our sample into two subperiods: (1) during and before 
August 2000, which is the date when Reg FD was passed, and (2) after August 2000. We then 
repeat the analyses in Table 3 for each of the two subperiods.  
Table 6 reports the results. In the pre-Reg FD sample, the coefficients on Competition × 
IASpread with HerfInst (HerfTrans) are a statistically significant -0.87 (-0.94), providing 
evidence that more competition is associated with a lower pricing of information asymmetry pre-
Reg FD. In the post-Reg FD sample, the coefficients are larger in magnitude but statistically 
insignificant. Despite the differences in statistical significance, one must be cautious in 
interpreting the results as evidence that competition has no significant role post-Reg FD. First, 
the time series is significantly shorter for the post-Reg FD period than for the pre–Reg FD 
period, and this can affect the power of the statistical tests. Second, confounding events (e.g., the 
decimalization of stock prices, Sarbanes Oxley, the tech bubble crash) occurred around and after 
the passage of Reg FD, making it difficult to attribute any difference solely to Reg FD. 
<INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE> 
VI. Competition, Information Asymmetry, and Information Quality  
Our hypothesis predicts that the pricing of information asymmetry decreases with 
competition. We test this hypothesis using the information asymmetry component of spread and 
PIN. Our goal is to provide evidence with empirical proxies that best approximate the economic 
construct of information asymmetry.  
In this section, we examine the implications of our earlier results for a fundamental issue 
in the accounting literature that has attracted extensive theoretical and empirical research: the 
pricing of information quality. The general prediction from this literature is that cost of capital is 
higher when information quality is poorer (e.g., Botosan 1997; Francis et al. 2004, 2005). This 
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argument is based on the idea that higher information quality reduces information asymmetry. To 
the extent that poorer information quality captures higher information asymmetry, the pricing of 
information quality should also decrease with more informed competition, given our previous 
results with information asymmetry. Hence, in this section, we investigate whether the pricing of 
information quality decreases with competition, under the assumption that information quality 
proxies for information asymmetry. 
To proxy for information quality (IQ), we use accruals quality (AQ) and earnings 
smoothness (Smoothness). These measures have been recently used in the literature in the 
context of the cost of capital (Francis et al. 2004, 2005; Core et al. 2008; McInnis 2010). We 
follow Francis et al. (2005) and estimate AQ as the standard deviation of the residuals during the 
years t-5 to t-1 from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals model, as modified by McNichols 
(2002).  The model is a cross-sectional regression of working capital accruals on lagged, current, 
and future cash flows, plus the change in revenue and PPE.  All variables are scaled by average 
total assets. Smoothness is the ratio of a firm’s standard deviation of net income before 
extraordinary items to its standard deviation of cash flows from operations from t-5 to t-1; net 
income and cash flows are scaled by average total assets. 
 Table 7 presents the results of cross-sectional asset pricing tests that examine whether the 
pricing of information quality varies cross-sectionally with competition. The regression 
specification follows Eq. (3), except that we now replace the information asymmetry measures 
with measures of information quality. Similar to our earlier regressions, the coefficient on the 
interaction term of IQ and Competition is the coefficient of interest in each of the columns. A 
statistically significant negative coefficient on this interaction term indicates that more 
competition is associated with the lower pricing of information quality.  
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The first three columns document the results with AQ as the proxy for information 
quality. From the first column, we observe that the coefficient on AQ is positive but statistically 
insignificant. This result is consistent with Core et al. (2008), who find that AQ is not priced on 
average. In the next column, the interaction term between AQ and HerfInst is a marginally 
significant -6.71 (p=0.09). This indicates that for a one standard deviation difference in AQ, 
which equals 0.03 in our sample, the monthly difference in the expected return in the most 
competitive quintile is 0.20 percent less than in the least competitive quintile. In the third 
column, the coefficient between AQ and HerfTrans is a statistically insignificant -5.81 (p=0.12). 
The next three columns present the results with Smoothness as the proxy for information 
quality. Smoothness is not priced on average, consistent with McInnis (2010). However, when 
we examine the pricing of Smoothness conditional on competition, we find some evidence that 
the pricing of information quality decreases with competition. In particular, the next two 
columns show the coefficient on the interaction term between Smoothness and HerfInst 
(HerfTrans) is marginally significant. In terms of economic significance, for a one standard 
deviation difference in Smoothness, which equals 0.52 in our sample, the monthly difference in 
the expected return in the most competitive quintile is 0.15 percent (0.14 percent) less than it is 
in the least competitive quintile. Overall, the results in Table 7 indicate some marginal evidence 
that the pricing of information quality decreases with more competition. 
<INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE> 
VII.   Conclusion  
 The issue of whether information asymmetry is priced has been of significant academic 
interest. We re-examine this question by emphasizing an important aspect of capital markets with 
information asymmetry—competition among informed investors over private information. While 
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prior research has investigated whether information asymmetry is priced on average, it has not 
studied whether there is cross-sectional variation in the pricing conditional on the extent of such 
competition.  
We measure competition as the number of total and transient institutional investors, as 
well as the Herfindahl indices measuring the distribution of information among each type of 
institutional investor. The implicit assumption underlying these measures is that institutional 
investors are relatively more informed investors and that the competition between informed 
investors captures the competition between informed traders. We measure information 
asymmetry using the information asymmetry components of the bid-ask spread and PIN.  
Consistent with our hypothesis, we show that the pricing of information asymmetry 
decreases with competition, and that this effect is economically important. We then explore the 
implications of this finding for the accounting literature that examines whether information 
quality, as a proxy for information asymmetry, is priced. We repeat our analyses by replacing our 
measures of information asymmetry proxies with measures of information quality, finding 
similar (albeit weaker) results. That is, our results indicate that the pricing of information quality 
marginally decreases with competition. 
 Future research into the effects of the information environment on the equity markets 
could consider the level of competition between informed investors over private information. A 
direct implication of our findings is that, in the face of information asymmetry, firms could 
potentially reduce their cost of capital by encouraging more competition. An indirect implication 
is that efforts to mitigate information asymmetry such as increased corporate disclosure and 
transparent financial reporting might have greater cost of capital effects in markets (either within 
a single country or across different countries) characterized by less competition. 
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Appendix A. The Decomposition of Bid-Ask Spread 
The following regression specification is used to obtain the parameters required to 
decompose the spread: 
i,s 0 i,s 1 i,s i,s 0 i,s 1 i,s i,sΔPrice =C ΔTrade +C ΔTrade ×TradeSize +Z Trade +Z Trade ×TradeSize +ε,      (A1) 
where, for the trade at time s for firm i, ΔPrice is the change in trade price scaled by the previous 
trade price, TradeSize is the number of shares traded, and Trade is an indicator that is equal to +1 
if the trade is classified as buyer-initiated and -1 if the trade is seller-initiated. 
A brief description of the intuition underlying Eq. (A1) is as follows: Glosten and Harris 
(1988) indicate that for a round-trip transaction, the non-information asymmetry component is 
obtained by 2(C0 + C1TradeSize) and the information asymmetry component of the bid-ask 
spread is obtained by 2(Z0 + Z1TradeSize), with the spread estimated as the sum of the two 
components. The first component allows market makers to generate revenue from a seemingly 
random order flow to cover inventory holding and order processing costs, as well as to provide 
monopoly profits. It is a transitory component because it is unrelated to the underlying value of 
the securities. The second component assumes that order flows will be correlated with future 
price changes. It arises because rational market makers in a competitive environment will widen 
the spread in response to information asymmetry. The scaling of price changes by the previous 
price - i.e., the use of intraday returns, facilitates cross-sectional comparability of information 
asymmetry across firms.  
Econometrically, it can be observed from Eq. (A1) that the key distinction between the 
information asymmetry component and the non-information asymmetry component is that the 
coefficients for the non-information asymmetry component are based on ΔTrade, while the 
coefficients for the information asymmetry component are based on Trade. The intuition for the 
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difference is as follows. The non-information asymmetry component assumes that market 
makers generate revenue using random switching between buyer- and seller-initiated trades to 
“buy low and sell high,” on average. ΔTrade captures the idea that, when a buy (sell) order is 
filled, market makers raise bid and/or ask prices to increase the probability that the next order 
will be a sell (buy) to maintain inventory. Price changes, which reflect the compensation to the 
market makers, reverse on average (i.e., the effect of trades on prices is transitory). The 
information asymmetry component captures the idea that buy orders (i.e., Trade = 1) cause 
“true” prices to rise by (Z0 + Z1TradeSize), while sell orders (i.e., Trade = -1) cause them to fall 
by (Z0 + Z1TradeSize). Buy and sell orders have a permanent effect on prices because they are 
due to a change in expectations of firm value. Eq. (A1) provides the regression coefficients, Z0, 
Z1, C0, and C1. For trade size, we compute the average trade size (AvgTradeSize).  
We compute the information asymmetry (IASpread) and non-information-asymmetry 
(NIASpread) components of the spread using the intraday data from the Institute for the Study of 
Security Markets database (ISSM) and the NYSE Trade and Quotes database (TAQ). ISSM 
provides the data for NYSE and AMEX firms from 1983 to 1992 and for NASDAQ firms from 
1987 to 1992. TAQ provides the data for NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms from 1993 to 
2008. Due to the extensive computational requirements, we use only the intraday data from 
December of each year to estimate the components. The exception is December 1989, due to 
missing data for NASDAQ firms for November and December 1989; in this case, we use 
intraday data from October 1989. We then express the components in percentages by multiplying 
them by 100, and winsorizing at the 1st and 99th percentile.   
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TABLE 1: Validation of Competition Proxies: Competition and Market Efficiency 
 
Panel A – Portfolio returns 
 
Competition  UE Quintile  
#Inst Quintile I II III IV V Hedge 
I -4.64 -3.07 0.15 6.30 9.12 13.77 
II -1.78 -0.46 3.07 6.28 9.87 11.65 
III -2.66 0.15 1.56 4.46 5.70 8.35 
IV -0.41 0.77 1.35 3.58 4.30 4.71 
V -0.05 0.96 1.01 1.95 2.81 2.86 
 
HerfInst Quintile I II III IV V Hedge 
I -4.40 -3.15 -0.75 5.56 9.16 13.55 
II -1.89 -0.73 3.28 6.16 9.70 11.59 
III -1.82 0.85 2.62 5.87 6.99 8.81 
IV -1.59 1.04 1.10 2.60 3.93 5.52 
V -1.15 0.21 0.69 2.19 1.80 2.95 
 
#Trans Quintile I II III IV V Hedge 
I -4.61 -2.03 0.75 6.45 9.59 14.20 
II -1.75 -0.22 1.97 6.68 9.80 11.54 
III -1.99 -0.18 2.85 4.34 7.09 9.08 
IV -1.57 0.67 0.73 3.36 3.95 5.53 
V -0.27 0.73 1.02 2.03 2.48 2.75 
 
HerfTrans Quintile I II III IV V Hedge 
I -2.96 -2.23 0.32 6.50 8.94 11.90 
II -2.48 -0.96 2.98 5.62 8.63 11.11 
III -3.13 0.18 2.16 5.07 8.04 11.18 
IV -1.92 0.28 1.27 2.96 4.38 6.30 
V -1.15 1.14 0.51 2.38 1.76 2.90 
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TABLE 1: Validation of Competition Proxies (cont’d) 
 
Panel B – Fama-MacBeth regressions 
 
 Competition 
 #Inst HerfInst #Trans HerfTrans 
 I II III IV 
Intercept -1.41 -1.95 -1.21 -1.50 
 (-0.42) (-0.57) (-0.36) (-0.44) 
Beta 0.06 0.17 0.10 0.19 
 (0.05) (0.13) (0.08) (0.14) 
Size -0.96** -0.77* -0.88** -0.75* 
 (-2.42) (-1.86) (-2.20) (-1.83) 
BTM 3.69*** 3.88*** 3.82*** 3.92*** 
 (3.74) (3.75) (3.77) (3.78) 
Volume -0.38 5.11* 2.95 6.05** 
 (-0.11) (1.77) (0.86) (2.07) 
Volatility -0.02 0.22 -0.39 -0.07 
 (-0.01) (0.07) (-0.12) (-0.02) 
Competition 12.02*** 5.61*** 8.01*** 3.96** 
 (3.55) (3.20) (2.87) (2.35) 
UE 15.12*** 15.11*** 14.56*** 14.37*** 
 (8.84) (8.85) (8.60) (8.55) 
UE x Volume 2.22 -3.47 -1.53 -4.35** 
 (0.73) (-1.60) (-0.58) (-1.96) 
UE x Volatility 0.43 0.27 0.98 0.79 
 (0.20) (0.13) (0.45) (0.36) 
UE x Competition -13.67*** -8.11*** -9.47*** -6.35*** 
 (-4.56) (-3.84) (-3.48) (-3.00) 
Adj-R2 (%) 4.59 4.59 4.53 4.54 
 
This table presents the results of tests that validate our proxies for competition: #Inst, HerfInst, #Trans, and 
HerfTrans. The sample consists of 411,032 firm-quarter earnings announcements from January 1983 through 
December 2008 with 12-month size-adjusted (i.e., abnormal) post-earnings-announcement buy-and-hold returns 
from 1984 to 2009. Panel A provides the returns of five-by-five portfolios formed by independent sorts of earnings 
surprises and competition within each quarter. Panel B provides the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions that 
examine how the returns associated with earnings surprises vary cross-sectionally with our competition proxies. 
#Inst (#Trans) is the number of institutional (transient institutional) investors before the earnings announcement. 
HerfInst (HerfTrans) is the Herfindahl measure of the concentration of institutional (transient institutional) investor 
holdings before the earnings announcement; this measure is multiplied by -1 so that it is increasing in competition. 
UE is the quintile rank of the earnings surprise and is increasing from Quintiles I to V. Competition is the quintile 
rank of each of the competition proxies and is increasing from Quintiles I to V. Volume is the quintile rank of the 
average daily dollar trading volume of the firm during the earnings announcement month. Volatility is the quintile 
rank of the standard deviation of the residuals of a regression of daily returns on the S&P500 index during the 
twelve months ending in the earnings announcement month, with the requirement that at least 24 daily returns are 
available for the regression. To ease exposition, all the quintile ranks are re-scaled to range from zero to one. Beta is 
the market beta from the regression of daily excess returns on daily market excess returns in the year ending in the 
month before the earnings announcement month, with the requirement that at least 24 daily returns are available for 
the regression. Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of the previous fiscal quarter. 
BTM is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity at the end of the 
previous fiscal quarter. The t-statistics are below the coefficients, in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed 
statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 2: Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
  
Variable Mean STD P25 Median P75 
Return 0.80 19.01 -7.47 -0.20 7.32 
IASpread (%) 0.23 0.33 0.05 0.12 0.28 
NIASpread (%) 1.13 1.71 0.14 0.46 1.40 
#Inst 89.33 125.45 17.00 46.00 110.00 
HerfInst -0.17 0.19 -0.20 -0.09 -0.05 
#Trans 27.10 39.37 4.00 13.00 35.00 
HerfTrans -0.37 0.32 -0.54 -0.24 -0.12 
Beta 0.88 0.60 0.46 0.81 1.23 
Size 5.64 1.97 4.23 5.55 6.94 
BTM -0.80 0.84 -1.25 -0.71 -0.27 
Turnover 0.09 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.10 
 
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
 
 Return IASpread NIASpread #Inst HerfInst #Trans HerfTrans Turnover 
Return --- 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
IASpread  --- 0.45 -0.33 -0.47 -0.33 -0.50 -0.12 
NIASpread   --- -0.33 -0.49 -0.33 -0.54 -0.08 
#Inst    --- 0.39 0.90 0.50 0.09 
HerfInst     --- 0.38 0.73 0.06 
#Trans      --- 0.52 0.14 
HerfTrans       --- 0.12 
Turnover        --- 
 
Panel A (B) presents the descriptive statistics (Pearson correlations) for the main variables. The sample consists of 
968,250 firm-months with monthly returns from January 1984 to December 2009. Return is the monthly returns in 
excess of the risk-free rate for the firm in year t+1. IASpread (NIASpread) is the information asymmetry (non-
information asymmetry) component of bid-ask spread; the components are obtained by decomposing the intraday 
spreads in December of year t. #Inst (#Trans) is the number of institutional investors (transient institutional 
investors) at the end of year t. HerfInst (HerfTrans) is the Herfindahl measure of the concentration of institutional 
investor holdings (transient institutional investor holdings) at the end of year t; this measure is multiplied by -1 so 
that it is increasing in competition. Beta is the market beta from the regression of daily excess stock returns on daily 
excess market returns in year t, with a minimum requirement of 24 daily returns. Size is the natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity in millions at the end of year t. BTM is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the book value of 
equity to the market value of equity at the fiscal year end at least three months before the end of year t. Turnover is 
the share turnover in December of year t. All correlations are significant at the 1% level. 
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TABLE 3: Pricing of Information Asymmetry– IASpread 
 
   Competition Proxy 
   #Inst HerfInst #Trans HerfTrans 
Intercept 0.37 1.75*** 1.12*** 1.66*** 1.15*** 
 (0.78) (4.48) (2.89) (4.14) (2.92) 
Beta -0.01 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.03 
 (-0.06) (0.17) (0.26) (0.02) (0.16) 
Size 0.06 -0.31*** -0.12** -0.26*** -0.12** 
 (0.89) (-5.09) (-2.35) (-4.37) (-2.19) 
BTM 0.26*** 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.26*** 
 (3.30) (3.03) (3.47) (3.24) (3.48) 
NIASpread 0.12 0.12** 0.13** 0.12** 0.14** 
 (1.62) (2.02) (2.24) (2.06) (2.29) 
IASpread 0.02 0.07 0.13 0.05 0.10 
 (0.12) (0.49) (0.82) (0.35) (0.68) 
Turnover  -0.64*** -0.42* -0.68*** -0.43* 
  (-2.73) (-1.73) (-2.97) (-1.84) 
Competition  2.26*** 1.10*** 2.01*** 1.07*** 
  (6.72) (5.16) (6.87) (5.63) 
Turnover  x NIASpread  0.00 -0.00 -0.03 -0.03 
  (0.02) (-0.02) (-0.17) (-0.14) 
Turnover  x IASpread  -0.18 -0.33 -0.06 -0.29 
  (-0.43) (-0.73) (-0.14) (-0.68) 
Competition  x NIASpread  -0.66 -0.84** -0.38 -0.33 
  (-1.40) (-2.26) (-0.89) (-1.04) 
Competition  x IASpread  -2.48** -1.66** -2.70*** -1.48** 
  (-2.46) (-2.22) (-2.73) (-2.19) 
Adj-R2 (%) 3.89 4.82 4.74 4.81 4.72 
 
This table presents the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions that examine how the pricing of information 
asymmetry, as proxied by IASpread, varies with Competition, as proxied by either Inst, HerfInst, #Trans or 
HerfTrans. The dependent variable is the monthly returns for a firm in year t+1, each of which is then matched to 
independent variables measured in year t. IASpread (NIASpread) is the information asymmetry (non-information 
asymmetry) component of bid-ask spread; the components are obtained by decomposing the intraday spreads in 
December of year t. #Inst (#Trans) is the number of institutional investors (transient institutional investors) at the 
end of year t. HerfInst (HerfTrans) is the Herfindahl measure of the concentration of institutional investor holdings 
(transient institutional investor holdings) at the end of year t; this measure is multiplied by -1 so that it is increasing 
in competition. Beta is the market beta from the regression of daily excess stock returns on daily excess market 
returns in year t, with a minimum requirement of 24 daily returns. Size is the natural logarithm of the market value 
of equity in millions at the end of year t. BTM is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the book value of equity to the 
market value of equity at the fiscal year end at least three months before the end of year t. Turnover is the monthly 
share turnover in December of year t. Competition and Turnover are converted into quintile ranks within each year 
and these quintile ranks are then scaled to range from zero to one. The sample consists of 968,250 firm-months with 
monthly returns from January 1984 to December 2009. The Fama-MacBeth t-statistics are below the coefficients, in 
parentheses. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 4: Pricing of Information Asymmetry – AdjPIN 
 
   Competition Proxy 
   #Inst HerfInst #Trans HerfTrans 
Intercept 0.44 1.13* 0.69 1.17* 0.78 
 (0.70) (1.85) (1.18) (1.92) (1.32) 
Beta -0.12 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 
 (-0.47) (-0.09) (-0.02) (-0.26) (-0.12) 
Size 0.06 -0.19** -0.04 -0.18** -0.05 
 (0.72) (-2.05) (-0.53) (-2.08) (-0.65) 
BTM 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.27*** 
 (3.89) (3.63) (4.08) (3.63) (3.96) 
PSOS 0.42* 0.65** 0.75** 0.62* 0.71** 
 (1.73) (1.99) (2.24) (1.89) (2.17) 
AdjPIN 0.52 0.64 0.55 0.64 0.51 
 (0.91) (1.30) (1.10) (1.29) (1.03) 
Turnover  -0.77** -0.61** -0.89*** -0.60** 
  (-2.54) (-2.06) (-2.88) (-2.04) 
Competition  2.22*** 1.40*** 2.34*** 1.42*** 
  (4.41) (4.35) (4.83) (4.07) 
Turnover  x PSOS  -0.47 -0.42 -0.42 -0.60 
  (-0.65) (-0.59) (-0.57) (-0.81) 
Turnover  x AdjPIN  1.74 1.27 1.90 1.43 
  (1.24) (0.93) (1.31) (1.03) 
Competition  x PSOS  -0.02 -0.85 -0.42 -0.65 
  (-0.03) (-1.22) (-0.57) (-0.90) 
Competition  x AdjPIN  -3.53* -3.30* -3.59* -3.31* 
  (-1.71) (-1.75) (-1.72) (-1.85) 
Adj-R2 (%) 3.24 3.99 3.93 3.97 3.91 
 
This table presents the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions that examine how the pricing of information 
asymmetry, as proxied by AdjPIN, varies with Competition, as proxied by either Inst, HerfInst, #Trans or HerfTrans. 
The dependent variable is the monthly returns for a firm in year t+1, each of which is then matched to independent 
variables measured in year t. AdjPIN (PSOS) is the information asymmetry (probability of symmetric order flow 
shock) component of PIN from Duarte and Young (2009). All the other variables are defined in Table 3. The sample 
consists of 470,875 firm-months with monthly returns from January 1984 to December 2005. The Fama-MacBeth t-
statistics are below the coefficients, in parentheses. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 5: NYSE and AMEX versus NASDAQ Firms 
 
 NYSE and AMEX NASDAQ 
  HerfInst HerfTrans HerfInst HerfTrans 
IASpread -0.01 0.03 0.10 0.03 
 (-0.02) (0.12) (0.51) (0.16) 
Competition 0.69*** 0.84*** 1.75*** 1.75*** 
 (3.59) (4.37) (4.46) (4.95) 
Competition  x IASpread -0.90 0.01 -2.44*** -1.63** 
 (-1.04) (0.01) (-2.68) (-2.02) 
 
This table presents the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions that examine how the pricing of information 
asymmetry, as proxied by IASpread, varies with competition, as proxied by HerfInst and HerfTrans, for two sub-
samples: (i) NYSE and AMEX firms and (ii) NASDAQ firms. As the sample period for the analyses with AdjPIN in 
Table 4 is from 1983 to 2004, we use this period for the analyses in this table. The sample for the NYSE and AMEX 
(NASDAQ) firms consists of 369,312 (427,633) firm-months with monthly returns from January 1984 to December 
2005. The regression specification in this table is the same as that in Table 3. For parsimony, only the coefficients on 
the key independent variables are reported. The Fama-MacBeth t-statistics are below the coefficients, in parentheses. 
Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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TABLE 6: Analysis of the Pre- and Post-Regulation Fair Disclosure Periods 
 
  Pre-Reg FD Post-Reg FD 
  HerfInst HerfTrans HerfInst HerfTrans 
IASpread 0.10 0.11 0.17 0.09 
 (0.61) (0.65) (0.56) (0.31) 
Competition 0.96*** 1.04*** 1.35*** 1.11*** 
 (3.82) (4.36) (3.47) (3.55) 
Competition  x IASpread -0.87* -0.94* -3.07 -2.45 
 (-1.79) (-1.85) (-1.62) (-1.48) 
 
This table presents the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions that examine how the pricing of information 
asymmetry, as proxied by IASpread, varies with competition, as proxied by HerfInst and HerfTrans, for two sub-
periods: (i) in and before August 2000, which is the date when Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) was passed, and 
(ii) after August 2000. The regression specification in this table is the same as that in Table 3. For parsimony, only 
the coefficients on the key independent variables are reported. The Fama-MacBeth t-statistics are below the 
coefficients, in parentheses. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
42
TABLE 7:  Pricing of Information Quality 
 
IQ = AQ IQ = Smoothness 
  HerfInst HerfTrans   HerfInst HerfTrans 
Intercept 1.54*** 1.35*** 1.45*** 1.41*** 1.47*** 1.55*** 
 (4.15) (3.63) (3.85) (3.42) (3.74) (3.88) 
Beta -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 
 (-0.13) (-0.05) (-0.14) (-0.16) (-0.15) (-0.25) 
Size -0.09 -0.16*** -0.18*** -0.08 -0.16** -0.18*** 
 (-1.60) (-2.70) (-2.93) (-1.29) (-2.56) (-2.72) 
BTM 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 
 (3.46) (3.49) (3.30) (3.93) (3.94) (3.90) 
IQ -1.72 5.65*** 5.07** 0.06 0.21** 0.19** 
  (-1.07) (2.73) (2.48) (0.84) (2.05) (1.99) 
Turnover  0.28 0.23  -0.21 -0.25 
  (1.24) (1.07)  (-0.99) (-1.26) 
Competition  0.74*** 0.88***  0.81*** 0.94*** 
  (3.84) (4.92)  (4.14) (5.58) 
IQ x Turnover  -8.75*** -8.35**  0.03 0.03 
  (-2.64) (-2.51)  (0.17) (0.19) 
IQ x Competition  -6.71* -5.81  -0.29* -0.27* 
  (-1.71) (-1.56)  (-1.78) (-1.68) 
Adj-R2 (%) 3.22 3.82 3.78 2.93 3.42 3.38 
 
This table presents the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions that examine how the pricing of information quality 
(IQ), as proxied by AQ and Smoothness, varies with competition, as proxied by HerfInst and HerfTrans. AQ, which 
is a measure of a lack of accruals quality, is the standard deviation of the residuals from regressions of the total 
current accruals on cash flow from operations in the prior, current, and following years; change in revenues; and 
gross plant, property, and equipment. Smoothness, which is a measure of a lack of earnings smoothness, is the ratio 
of a firm’s standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items divided by beginning total assets to its 
standard deviation of cash flows from operations divided by beginning total assets. All the other variables are 
defined in Table 3. The sample for AQ (Smoothness) consists of 576,060 (747,223) firm-months with monthly 
returns from January 1984 to December 2009. The Fama-MacBeth t-statistics are below the coefficients, in 
parentheses. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
  
  
 
 
